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THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF TRIBAL PAYDAY LENDING TO 
TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
 
Bree R. Black Horse* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Tribal leaders are regularly confronted with the challenge of funding 
their sovereign nations and providing for their people during this era of 
economic volatility and stagnant growth. While some tribal nations 
possess the substantial financial and natural resources necessary to 
overcome the difficulties associated with achieving self-determination, 
economic self-sufficiency, and self-governance, the reality is many tribal 
nations do not. Tribes geographically isolated from urban areas and 
lacking in natural resources often struggle to not only meet the needs of 
their people, but also to operate sustainable sovereign nations that 
provide all of the systems and resources present in modern governments. 
For these tribes, online payday lending operations may provide a 
temporary solution.  
 
Opponents of tribal payday lending claim that non-Indian lenders 
attempt to conduct business with Indian tribes under the guise of the 
alleged “sovereignty model” in an effort to evade regulations and 
prosecution. While these critics question the legality and transparency of 
tribally affiliated payday lending operations, some tribal nations are 
operating payday lending enterprises consistent with the policies and legal 
framework of tribal sovereign immunity. Namely, the lending operations 
executed by the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma serve as an example of a 
tribally run business entitled to sovereign immunity.  
 
This article begins with an exploration of the payday lending 
industry and the payday loan itself, emphasizing the arguments for and 
against allowing payday loans. Next, it will briefly discuss several state 
and federal efforts to regulate the payday lending industry in order to 
provide for an understanding of the regulatory entities that will likely 
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challenge the right tribes possess to operate payday lending enterprises. 
With the backdrop of the short-term, small-dollar credit market set, the 
relationship between tribes and payday lending is introduced.  
 
 While organizations argue both sides of the payday lending debate 
and regulators attempt to take action against the predatory practice, tribes 
may yet have the opportunity to operate such businesses under the 
sovereignty model. After a discussion concerning the basic principles of 
sovereign immunity, the wide array of the arm of the tribe tests 
implemented by the federal courts of appeals are examined in detail. At 
the conclusion of the discussion, a universal arm of the tribe test, informed 
by the trends in the federal courts, is presented and applied to an example 
entity from a federally recognized tribe. 
 
I. THE PRACTICE AND REGULATION OF THE PAYDAY LENDING INDUSTRY 
 
A. An Examination of the Short-Term, Small-Dollar Credit 
Market 
 
1. What is a Payday Loan?  
 
A payday loan is a small personal loan secured by direct access to 
the borrower’s bank account, either through a post-dated check or other 
authorization to withdraw funds from the account on the borrower’s next 
payday. Obtaining a payday loan is relatively simple when compared to 
the requirements of obtaining a traditional bank-issued loan. Payday 
lenders often only require verification of an open bank account, a steady 
source of income, and identification for approval whereas traditional 
lenders commonly require satisfactory credit history and asset-based 
collateral to obtain a loan. In general, payday loans range in size from 
$100 to $1,000, and the average loan term is about two weeks. A payday 
loan is typically referred to as short-term, small-dollar credit due to the 
repayment period and the dollar amount of the loan.  
 
Although borrowing is generally concentrated among younger, low-
to-moderate-income individuals, research shows that people of most ages 
and incomes utilize payday loans.1 More than twelve million Americans 
                                                           
1
 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS SAFE SMALL-DOLLAR LOANS RESEARCH PROJECT, PAYDAY 
LENDING IN AMERICA: PART ONE - WHO BORROWS, WHERE THEY BORROW, AND WHY 10 
(2012), www.pewtrusts.org/small-loans (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
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use payday loans annually.2 Significantly, about three-quarters of 
borrowers obtain a payday loan through a storefront operation, while 
roughly one-quarter of borrowers acquire a payday loan online.3 With 
millions of Americans routinely using this loan method, payday lending has 
grown into a multi-billion dollar industry. Payday loan users spend 
approximately $7.4 billion annually at over 36,000 storefront operations 
and at hundreds of online websites.4  
 
2. The Payday Loan Debate 
 
While payday loans are advertised as short-term, small-dollar credit 
intended for emergency or special use, a majority of borrowers5 use 
payday loans to cover ordinary living expenses over the course of months 
– not for unexpected emergencies over the course of weeks.6 In reality, a 
borrower’s initial reasons for taking out a payday loan stem from an 
ongoing need for income, rather than a short-term need to cover an 
unexpected expense.7 A typical borrower uses payday loans multiple 
times a year, and much of this borrowing comes in relatively quick 
succession once the borrower begins using payday loans.8 To illustrate, 
the average borrower takes out eight individual loans of $375 each per 
year, and spends $520 on interest annually.9 As a result, the typical 
borrower is indebted about five to seven months of the year.10  
 
Industry advocates and regulators advise consumers that using 
payday loans for recurring expenses is not an effective use of this high-
cost credit, and emphasize that payday loans should be used to cover 
unexpected expenses for a short period of time.11 In reality, about two-
thirds of borrowers use a payday loan to cover a recurring monthly 
                                                           
2
 Id.  
3
 Id. at 9. 
4
 Id. 
5
 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS SAFE SMALL-DOLLAR LOANS RESEARCH PROJECT, PAYDAY 
LENDING IN AMERICA: PART TWO HOW BORROWERS CHOOSE AND REPAY PAYDAY LOANS 9 
(2013) (Four times more storefront borrowers used their first payday loan for a recurring 
expense (69 percent) than an unexpected expense (16 percent)).  
6
 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS SAFE SMALL-DOLLAR LOANS RESEARCH PROJECT, PAYDAY 
LENDING IN AMERICA: WHO BORROWS, WHERE THEY BORROW, AND WHY 6 (2012), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_detail.aspx?id=327397 (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).  
7
 Id at 10.  
8
 Id. at 13.  
9
 Id. 
10
 Id. at 13.  
11
 Id. at 11.  
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expense,12 while only one-third of borrowers use a payday loan to deal 
with an unexpected expense.13 The controversial lending practices 
associated with payday loans, such as high interest rates and chronic 
borrowing, have ignited a fierce debate between consumer advocates, 
government officials, and representatives of the payday lending industry.  
 
Opponents of payday lending claim that the practice is unethical in 
nature, preying on overburdened low-income individuals. For instance, the 
profitability of payday lenders is contingent on repeat borrowing, as a new 
customer only becomes profitable for the lender after the fourth or fifth 
loan.14 Consumer groups also contend that payday loans are expensive 
debt, with interest rates often exceeding 400% APR.15 Furthermore, 
opponents argue that a payday loan is usually impossible to repay by the 
borrower’s next payday.16 Moreover, most borrowers renew or re-borrow 
rather than repay their loans.17 As a result, opponents claim that 
consumers are trapped in a cycle of debt subject to unfavorable and costly 
repayment terms.  
 
On the other hand, advocates of payday lending argue that the 
model is a vital resource to under-banked18 individuals facing an urgent 
need to solve temporary problems. In support of this argument, 
proponents cite the simplicity of the application process, and nearly 
immediate loan approval followed by a direct disbursement of cash funds. 
To demonstrate, payday lenders offer instant loan approval or denial 
decisions, and loan determinations are commonly based on the 
verification of employment rather than credit history or asset collateral. 
Advocates conclude that a payday loan is an easily attainable, unsecured 
                                                           
12
 Id. (Examples of recurring monthly expense include rent or mortgage payments, food, 
utilities, car payments, and credit card payments). 
13
 Id. at 14. 
14
 Id. at 15.  
15
 www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0097-payday-loans  (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
16
 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS SAFE SMALL-DOLLAR LOANS RESEARCH PROJECT, PAYDAY 
LENDING IN AMERICA: PART TWO HOW BORROWERS CHOOSE AND REPAY PAYDAY LOANS 9 
(2013) (The average borrower can afford to pay $50 per two weeks to a payday lender, 
but only 14 percent can afford the more than $400 needed to pay off the full amount of 
these non-amortizing loans).  
17
 Id. at 13-19.  
18
 THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE COMPANY (“Under-banked” consumers typically hold 
a bank account, but also rely on alternative financial services such as non-bank check 
cashing services, non-bank remittances, pawn shops, rent-to-own services, and payday 
loans), http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
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debt designed to assist a financially challenged borrower in a timely 
manner.  
 
In an effort to combat the claims of opponents, the payday loan 
industry trade group issued best practices, and a customer bill of rights.19 
The payday lending industry’s stated best practices limit individual loan 
rollovers and encourage lenders to offer extended repayment plans.20 
Despite the promotion of these standards, marketing and lending practices 
differ greatly. In light of the recent payday lending debate and inconsistent 
business practices, most states have taken regulatory action intended to 
curb predatory practices. 
 
B.  State Regulation of the Payday Lending Industry 
 
Currently, payday lending is primarily regulated at the state level 
through statutes designed to enable, control, or prohibit payday lending. 
Legislative efforts typically mandate interest caps, limit the number of 
loans a borrower can take on an annual basis, and implement more 
consumer-friendly repayment terms. Most states have taken some 
regulatory action in light of the recent controversy stemming from payday 
lending practices, but these regulatory schemes range from permissive to 
prohibitory.  
 
A majority of states take a permissive regulatory approach to 
payday lending, implementing either minimal guidelines or no regulations 
at all. Twenty-eight states21 follow this permissive regulatory approach, 
under which payday lenders can easily charge triple digit interest rates 
and dictate stringent repayment terms.  
                                                           
19
 The Community Financial Services of America member best practices, 
http://cfsaa.com/cfsa-member-best-practices.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
20
 Id. 
21
 Permissive states allow single-repayment loans with APRs exceeding 391%. These 
states include Alabama, Alaska, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming. http://www.pewstates.org/research/data-
visualizations/state-payday-loan-regulation-and-usage-rates-85899405695 (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2013). 
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In states that enact strong consumer protections, the result is a 
large net decrease in payday loan usage.22 Moreover, borrowers residing 
in these states are not driven to seek payday loans online or from other 
sources in response to stringent regulations.23 While many states have 
enacted legislation over the past decade intended to curb predatory 
payday lending practices, federal regulators have only recently addressed 
the controversial practices associated with the payday lending industry. 
 
C.  Federal Regulation of the Payday Lending Industry 
 
Federal policy on payday lending is swiftly developing, with action 
both at the congressional and executive levels. Beginning in 2007, 
Congress enacted a law regulating payday lending practices involving 
members of the armed services and their families.24 More recently, the 
SAFE Lending Act was introduced in the 112th Congress.25 The Act would 
require online lenders to abide by the regulations of the state in which the 
borrower resides.26 Correspondingly, there was also a similar House Bill 
introduced in the same session.27     
 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act and the Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 established the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau.28 The Bureau was created for the purpose, among other things, of 
protecting consumers from abusive financial service practices.29 
Accordingly, the Bureau has the authority to regulate payday loans.30 
While the Bureau recently commenced its first field hearing to gather 
information on the short-term, small-dollar credit market, it has not yet 
                                                           
22
 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS SAFE SMALL-DOLLAR LOANS RESEARCH PROJECT, PAYDAY 
LENDING IN AMERICA: WHO BORROWS, WHERE THEY BORROW, AND WHY 22-24 (2012), 
www.pewtrusts.org/small-loans (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).  
23
 Id. 
24
 10 U.S.C. § 987, 32 C.F.R. § 232.3 (The Talent-Nelson Amendment to the John 
Warner National Defense Authorization Act, limits the permissible annual percentage rate 
and creates structural requirements for certain small dollar loans issued to members of 
the armed services and their dependents). 
25
 SAFE Lending Act, S. 3426, 112th Cong. (2012). 
26
 Id. 
27
 SAFE Lending Act, H.R. 6483, 112th Cong. (2012).  
28
 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§5301-
5641 (2010). 
29
 124 Stat. §1376. 
30
 12 U.S.C. § 5514.  
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taken measurable regulatory or legal action against payday lenders.31 
However, consumer advocates and federal officials anticipate that the 
Bureau will play a significant role in the future. Despite the absence of 
action from the Bureau, the Federal Trade Commission has recently taken 
an active role in policing the payday lending industry.   
 
The Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, 
while lacking jurisdiction over banks, can exercise authority over the 
payday lending industry.32 With regard to payday lenders, the FTC 
enforces the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Truth In Lending Act, 
and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act.33 In 2011, the FTC brought action 
against numerous payday lenders, including tribal entities, for various 
deceptive practices in federal district court.34   
 
II.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIAN TRIBES AND THE PAYDAY LENDING 
INDUSTRY 
 
Over the past two decades, the short-term, small-dollar credit 
market landscape has changed dramatically. While the payday loan 
industry mainly serves customers and generates revenue through 
storefront operations, the early twenty-first century has witnessed a 
migration of payday loan providers to the internet. 35  Consumer advocates 
and some storefront lenders have cautioned that online payday lending 
can exploit borrowers because these online loans often occur outside of 
the reach of state regulators.36 Although some lenders purport to be state-
licensed and to comply with state interest rate caps and loan terms, 
numerous online lenders claim choice of law from states with no rate caps 
                                                           
31
 Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Examines Payday 
Lending (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-examines-payday-lending/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
32
 The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012). 
33
 Id. 
34
 See Federal Trade Commission v. AMG Services, Inc., et al. Case No. 2:12-cv-00536, 
FTC File No. 112 3024 (2012); and Federal Trade Commission v. Payday Financial, et al. 
Case No. 3:11-cv-03017-RAL, FTC File No. 112 3023 (2012). 
35
 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, A SHORT HISTORY OF PAY DAY LENDING LAW 1 (2012) 
(citing GARY RIVLIN, BROKE USA: FROM PAWNSHOPS TO POVERTY, INC. – HOW THE WORKING 
POOR BECAME BIG BUSINESS 54 (2001)).  
36
 LAUREN K. SANDERS, ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, STOPPING THE PAYDAY 
LOAN TRAP: ALTERNATIVES THAT WORK, ONES THAT DON’T 4-6 (2010) (describing payday 
loans and the harms they cause consumers), 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday_loans/report-stopping-
payday-trap.pdf  (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
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or from foreign countries.37 Notably, a growing number of online lenders 
claim to be exempt from state law enforcement as a result of tribal 
sovereign immunity. Controversy has developed with regards to online 
payday lending operations that evade state regulations by affiliating with 
Native American tribes. 
 
Sovereign immunity generally precludes tribally run businesses 
from state regulations.38 Some tribes have claimed immunity in state and 
federal courts on behalf of the payday lending entities that consumer 
groups accuse of charging usurious interest rates to mainly low-income 
borrowers. Tribally affiliated payday lenders, due to this claim of immunity, 
are able to operate internet-based payday lending businesses in states 
where the interest rates charged by lenders exceed those permitted by the 
state or in states where payday lending is banned all together. This 
immunity is commonly referred to as the “sovereignty model.” 
 
There are more than 560 federally recognized sovereign tribes in 
the United States, many of which do not benefit from the gaming industry, 
a proximity to urban centers, or abundant natural resources. For many 
tribes, geography creates a number of barriers to promoting economic 
growth. Proponents of tribal payday lending argue that these barriers to 
economic growth create a need for tribal internet-based opportunities.39  
 
Presently, there are at least eleven federally recognized Native 
American tribes affiliated with payday lending.40 A majority of the 
companies offering payday lending services claim ownership and 
operation by tribes located in Oklahoma, but numerous tribes from 
California to Wisconsin participate in the payday lending business. 
 
 The controversy surrounding tribally affiliated payday lending 
operations is predominately centered on the tribal lenders’ immunity from 
                                                           
37
 CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, CFA SURVEY OF ONLINE PAYDAY LOAN WEBSITES 5-
6 (2011).  
38
 See infra note 54.  
39
 Native American Financial Services Association, http://www.mynafsa.org/useful-
information/nafsa-fact-sheet/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2013) (one of two trade organizations 
for tribally-affiliated payday lenders). 
40
 Big Lagoon Rancheria Band of Yurok and Tolowa Indians; Big Valley Band of Pomo 
Indians; Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe of Nebraska; Chippewa Cree Tribe; Miami Tribe of 
Oklahoma; Modoc Tribe of Oklahoma; Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians; Santee Sioux 
Nation of Nebraska; Sokaogon Chippewa Community; Tunica-Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana; 
United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians.  
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state regulation and suit. Tribes are entitled to this immunity under the 
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Tribal businesses may also enjoy the 
protections of sovereign immunity if they function as an “arm of the tribe.” 
Critics of tribal payday lending and tribal officials disagree as to the legal 
status of these operations. Under established Federal Indian Law, the only 
manner in which to resolve the question of whether tribal payday lenders 
are entitled to the protections of tribal sovereign immunity is to submit 
tribal payday lending entities to an arm of the tribe analysis.  
 
In order to determine whether tribal payday lending entities operate 
as an arm of the tribe consistent with the doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity, it is necessary to review the principles of tribal sovereign 
immunity, and the corresponding arm of the tribe test. First, the history 
and policies underlying the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity will be 
examined. Next, the several arm of the tribe tests used by the federal 
courts of appeals will be scrutinized. From this point, it is possible to 
deduct a universal arm of the tribe test by which the immunity question 
can be resolved. Consequently, this proposed universal arm of the tribe 
test is applied to a specific tribe that operates payday lending entities. 
 
III. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE ARM OF THE TRIBE TEST AND 
PAYDAY LENDING 
 
A. The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
 
1. The General Principles of Tribal Sovereign Immunity  
 
The Supreme Court of the United States has erroneously implied 
that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity developed almost by 
accident, resting on a single misinformed decision in the early twentieth 
century. However, the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is firmly 
established law in American courts.41 Despite the Court’s limited 
enthusiasm, tribal sovereign immunity is an inherent, retained sovereignty 
that predates European contact, the founding of the United States, the 
United States Constitution, and individual statehood. Accordingly, Indian 
tribes are distinct, independent political communities, retaining their 
                                                           
41
 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 
(1998); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919); see, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n 
v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991).  
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original natural rights as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time 
immemorial.42  
 
Although no longer possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, 
Indian tribes are domestic dependent nations entitled to all powers except 
those they have been forced to surrender to a single superior sovereign, 
the United States.43 Tribes are not states, nor part of the federal 
government.44 Rather, tribes enjoy a status higher than that of states, 
because tribes are sovereign political entities possessed of sovereign 
authority not derived from the United States.45 Consequently, tribal 
immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the 
states.46 
 
The Court has taken the lead in drawing the bounds of tribal 
immunity, beginning in the late twentieth century, following a surge in tribal 
economic development. However, Congress, subject to constitutional 
limits, can alter the bounds of tribal immunity through explicit legislation.47 
Under federal law, the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity precludes suit 
against a federally recognized Indian tribe except in instances where 
Congress has abrogated that immunity or the tribe has foregone it.48 
Accordingly, congressional abrogation or tribal waiver of sovereign 
immunity cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed.49 The 
relevant inquiry with respect to a tribe’s exercise of its sovereignty is 
whether Congress, which exercises plenary power over Indian affairs,50 
                                                           
42
 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832). 
43
 Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. at 
509 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 13 (1831)); Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978). 
44
 National Labor Relations Board v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1192 (10th 
Cir.2002).  
45
 Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 
(10th Cir.1959) (Tribes are subordinate and dependent nations possessed of all powers 
as such, only to the extent that they have expressly been required to surrender them by 
the United States, and the United States Constitution is binding upon Indian nations only 
where it expressly binds them or is made binding by Treaty or by some act of Congress). 
46
 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. at 756; see, 
e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. World Engineering, 476 U.S. 
877, 891 (1986). 
47
 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. at 759; see, 
e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58. 
48
 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. at 754.  
49
 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58. 
50
 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
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has limited that sovereignty in any way.51 With regard to tribal sovereign 
immunity, Congress has elected to not obstruct the doctrine in an effort to 
encourage tribal economic development and self-sufficiency. 
 
2. Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Tribal Enterprises 
 
Tribal sovereign immunity applies without distinction between on-
reservation or off-reservation activities, and between governmental or 
commercial activities.52 Despite criticism that in some instances off-
reservation tribal commercial businesses have become disconnected from 
tribal self-governance, Congress has elected to not abrogate tribal 
sovereign immunity with respect to these revenue generating business 
activities. Following the lead of Congress, the Court has upheld the 
application of tribal sovereign immunity to tribal businesses regardless of 
location or industry.53  
 
Tribal sovereign immunity protects subordinate secular or 
commercial entities acting as arms of a tribe from state regulation and 
legal action.54 Tribal sovereign immunity may extend to the subdivisions of 
a tribe, including those engaged in economic activities, provided that the 
relationship between the tribe and the entity is sufficiently close to properly 
permit the entity to share in the tribe’s immunity.55 In order to determine 
which tribal entities can share in a tribe’s immunity, courts implement what 
is commonly referred to as the “arm of the tribe” test.   
 
 
 
                                                           
51
 See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852-53 
(1985).  
52
 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. at 754-55. 
53
 Id., at 757. 
54
 Memphis Biofuels, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d 917, 920-21 (6th 
Cir.2009); Native American Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 
1292 (10th Cir.2008); Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir.2006); 
Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir.2000); Ninigret 
Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuch Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 29 (1st 
Cir.2000). 
55
 See Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuch Hous. Auth , 207 F.3d at 
29 (stating that tribal housing authority “as an arm of the Tribe, enjoys the full extent of 
the Tribe’s sovereign immunity”); Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 455 F.3d 974, 978 
(9th Cir.2002) (recognizing that tribal sovereign immunity “extends to agencies and 
subdivisions of the tribe”). 
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B.  The Sovereign Immunity of Tribal Entities: The Arm of the 
Tribe Test   
 
Although the Court has not directly addressed the issue of which 
specific tribal entities acting as arms of a tribe are entitled to immunity, the 
Court has acknowledged that the United States has taken the position that 
corporate entities may be arms of the tribe entitled to the protections of 
tribal sovereign immunity.56 Recognizing that Congress has not imposed 
any limitations on the application of tribal sovereign immunity to entities 
acting as arms of a tribe, all of the federal courts of appeals acknowledge 
that certain tribal corporate entities may enjoy the full extent of a tribe’s 
sovereign immunity under specific circumstances.57 
 
Consistent with federal Indian policy, the federal courts have 
established general rules regarding the application of tribal sovereign 
immunity derived from the reality of tribes’ need to generate revenue 
through operating tribal businesses. As a threshold matter, an individual 
member of a federally recognized tribe operating a business entity is not 
entitled to tribal sovereign immunity.58 Furthermore, a tribal entity engaged 
in business does not lose its immunity simply by contracting with non-
Indian operators of the business.59 This is because, as a matter of 
established federal Indian policy, Indian nations must be encouraged to 
generate their own revenue to fund their governments and activities. 
Therefore, tribes must be free to enter into commercial areas where they 
do not have expertise but have the ability to acquire the necessary 
expertise through non-Indian operators.60  
                                                           
56
 See Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701, 705 n. 1 (2003) (noting 
that the United States asserted, and the County did not dispute, that a corporation 
operating a casino was an arm of the tribe for the purposes of sovereign immunity). 
57
 See, e.g., Memphis Biofuels, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d at 920-
21; Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d at 1292; Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 
F.3d at 1046-47; Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d at 1042-43; Ninigret 
Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuch Hous. Auth , 207 F.3d at 29. 
58
 Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dept. of Game of State of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 171-172 (1977); 
Individual tribal members operating online payday loan companies have claimed tribal 
sovereign immunity in various court proceedings. See PayDay Financial, LLC d/b/a 
Lakota Cash; PayDay Financial, LLC, also d/b/a Western Sky Financial, LLC; and Great 
Sky Finance, LLC.  
59
 See Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d at 1296 (Tribal tobacco company immune 
despite fact that non-Indians operated company through a management agreement).  
60
 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (noting with 
approval that the tribal business was “operated by non-Indian professional operators, 
who receive a percentage of the profits”). 
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 In the absence of clarifying Court precedent, all of the federal 
courts of appeals have developed standards for determining which tribally 
affiliated entities are allowed immunity from regulation and legal suit. 
Rather than depending on the nature of the business a tribe is conducting 
through a particular entity, the question of whether tribal immunity is to be 
extended to the entity depends on whether, in the language of the federal 
courts, the entity is an “arm of the tribe.”61 According to all the federal 
courts of appeals, the proper inquiry is whether the entity acts as an arm 
of the tribe such that its activities are properly deemed to be those of the 
tribe.62 Each of the federal courts of appeals applies a unique arm of the 
tribe test, taking numerous and varied factors into consideration when 
determining which entities are entitled to tribal sovereign immunity.  
 
 In general, the federal courts of appeals implement tests that 
typically evaluate the creation of the entity, the benefits accorded to the 
tribe by the entity, the amount of control the tribe exerts over the entity, 
and whether the policies of tribal sovereign immunity would be served by 
holding the entity as an arm of the tribe. In the application of the arm of the 
tribe test, the federal courts vary in complexity and emphasis, often 
assigning varying weights to a diverse range of factors. While all of the 
federal courts apply slightly unique tests, the analyses of the First, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals are representative of the 
diversity existent in federal Indian law, presented here from the least to 
most exacting. 
 
1. First Circuit 
 
The First Circuit utilizes an arm of the tribe test contingent upon a 
single factor. Specifically, the First Circuit analysis solely evaluates the 
creation of the entity, requiring only that the entity be formed pursuant to 
tribal law in order to enjoy immunity. In Ninigret Development Corp. v. 
Narragansett Indian Wetuomuch Housing Authority, the court held that a 
tribal housing authority is entitled to the full extent of tribal sovereign 
immunity.63  
 
                                                           
61
 Memphis Biofuels, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d at 920-921. 
62
 Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1046; see also Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton 
Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d at 1043; Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuch 
Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d at 29.  
63
 Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuch Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d at 21.  
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Although the issue of tribal sovereign immunity received limited 
discussion in the opinion, the Ninigret court cited the creation of the tribal 
housing authority pursuant to a tribal ordinance as sufficient justification 
for holding that the tribal housing authority is an arm of the tribe.64 A tribal 
housing authority functions as an arm of the tribe, and thus is entitled to 
exercise the defense of tribal sovereign immunity. The arm of the tribe test 
implemented by the First Circuit illustrates the least strenuous test present 
in the federal court system, hinging only on the method of creation of the 
entity at issue.  
 
2. Eighth Circuit 
 
The Eighth Circuit employs a more exacting arm of the tribe test 
than the First Circuit. The Eighth Circuit test assesses the creation, 
funding, and control of the entity as well as the benefits accorded to the 
tribe by the entity. In Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Community, the court 
held that a tribal community college is an arm of the tribe, and thus entitled 
to tribal sovereign immunity.65  
 
The entity at issue in Hagen was a tribal community college. The 
college was created pursuant to tribal law, and the college was chartered 
as a nonprofit corporation under the tribal constitution.66 The Hagen court 
found both of these facts to favor the extension of tribal sovereign 
immunity to the college.67 After examining the creation of the college, the 
court addressed the control and funding of the college. 
 
The court also found that the college was sufficiently controlled and 
funded68 by the tribe to grant the entity immunity from suit. First, the 
college’s board of trustees is comprised of one enrolled member from 
each of the tribe’s seven districts, which constituted appropriate tribal 
control of the entity in the view of the court.69 Significantly, the college was 
founded to provide direct benefit to tribal members on the reservation by 
providing post-secondary education.70 In sum, the college is chartered, 
funded, and adequately controlled by the tribe for the purposes of 
                                                           
64
 Id. at 26-27.  
65
 Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d at 1040.  
66
 Id. at 1042.  
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. (The court found that the tribe directly funded the College). 
69
 Id. at 1043. 
70
 Id. 
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providing education to tribal members on Indian land. Therefore, the 
Hagen court concluded, the college functioned as more than a mere 
business, the college was an arm of the tribe entitled to sovereign 
immunity.  
Similar to the arm of the tribe tests used by the First and Eighth 
Circuits, the Ninth Circuit analysis also examines the creation, funding, 
and control of the entity by the tribe. However, the Ninth Circuit test is 
more exacting than the First and Eighth Circuits as the Ninth Circuit 
evaluates several additional factors.  
 
3. Ninth Circuit 
 
The Ninth Circuit implements an arm of the tribe test evaluating not 
only the creation, control71 and funding of the entity, but also the benefits 
accorded to the tribe by the entity and the policies of tribal sovereign 
immunity. Specifically, in regard to the underlying policy considerations of 
tribal sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit evaluates whether the policies 
of tribal sovereign immunity are served by regarding the entity in question 
to function as an arm of the tribe. In reaching a conclusion, the court 
acknowledged that while a casino is no ordinary business, a tribal casino 
is nevertheless entitled to tribal sovereign immunity because it properly 
functions as an arm of the tribe.72 
 
In Allen v. Gold Country Casino, the entity at issue was a tribal 
casino.73 As justification for the holding, the court first relied on the 
findings relating to the method and process by which the casino was 
created. The formation of the casino was dependent upon tribal, state, and 
federal approval at numerous levels because the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (IGRA) governs the process.74 Importantly, the Allen court 
cited the passage of numerous tribal ordinances in order to create the 
casino as support for the extension of tribal sovereign immunity.75 The 
Allen court concluded that the casino was adequately created, owned, and 
                                                           
71
 Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1047 (The court, relying on the stringent 
requirements of IGRA, simply conceded that the casino is without question owned and 
operated by the Tribe). 
72
 Id. at 1047-1049. 
73
 Id. 
74
 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (The IGRA requires a tribe to 
authorize the creation of a tribal casino through both a tribal ordinance and an interstate 
gaming compact with the respective state). 
75
 Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1047-1049. 
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operated by the tribe to sustain a holding that the entity acted as an arm of 
the tribe. 
 
The Allen court additionally relied upon the benefits the casino 
provides to the tribe and the congressional policies underlying a tribal 
casino to support the holding that the casino is an arm of the tribe. To 
begin with, the court determined that the benefit immunity would extend to 
the tribe would protect the treasury of the tribe; this directly served one of 
the purposes of tribal sovereign immunity.76 Moreover, IGRA provides for 
the creation and operation of Indian casinos to promote “tribal economic 
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments,”77 all of 
which are corresponding goals of tribal sovereign immunity. Specifically, 
the compact enabling the creation of the casino provides that the casino 
will “enable the tribe to develop self-sufficiency, promote tribal economic 
development, and generate jobs and revenues to support the tribe’s 
government, and governmental services and programs.”78 The court 
determined that because the tribe owned and operated the casino, there is 
no question these numerous economic and invaluable social advantages 
ensure the benefit of the tribe itself.79 
 
Under the Ninth Circuit arm of the tribe test, the creation of the 
entity, the control exerted by the tribe over the entity, the benefits 
accorded to the tribe by the entity, and the policies of tribal sovereign 
immunity are examined. However, the arm of the tribe test implemented 
by the Tenth Circuit dwarfs those of the Frist, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. 
The Tenth Circuit illustrates the most complex arm of the tribe test, 
incorporating six factors to aid in the sovereign immunity determination.  
 
4. Tenth Circuit 
 
The Tenth Circuit represents the most rigorous arm of the tribe test 
present in Federal Indian Law today. The Tenth Circuit analysis submits 
six factors for consideration, which range from the intention of the tribe in 
creating the entity to the details of the financial relationships between the 
                                                           
76
 Id. at 1048 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999)) (Noting that sovereign 
immunity protects the financial integrity of States, many of which “could have been forced 
into insolvency but for their immunity from private suits for money damages”). 
77
 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (One of the principle purposes of IGRA is “to ensure that the Indian 
tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation).  
78
 Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1047-1048.  
79
 Id. at 1048. 
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parties involved.80 Specifically, in determining whether an entity is entitled 
to tribal sovereign immunity, the Tenth Circuit gives weight to the following 
factors: (1) the method of the entity’s creation; (2) the purpose of the 
entity; (3) the structure, ownership, and management, including the 
amount of control the tribe has over the entity; (4) whether the tribe 
intended for the entity to have tribal sovereign immunity; (5) the financial 
relationship between the tribe and the entity; and, (6) whether the 
purposes of tribal sovereign immunity are served by granting the entity 
immunity.81  
 
In Breakthrough Management Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold 
Casino and Resort, the entity at issue was a tribal Economic Development 
Authority (the Authority), which owned and operated a casino in addition to 
other enterprises.82 The governing body of tribes often creates an 
economic development authority to manage tribal economic and social 
enterprises. The court held that the Authority enjoys immunity from suit as 
an arm of the tribe.83 
 
The BMG court found the first factor, the method of creation of the 
entity, and the fourth factor, whether the tribe intended for the entity to 
enjoy immunity, to favor the extension of tribal sovereign immunity based 
on tribal law and internal tribal corporate documents. Under the first factor, 
the entity was created pursuant to tribal law.84 Additionally, the language 
used by the tribe described the entity as a “wholly owned enterprise of the 
tribe,” which the court noted to naturally suggest that the entity enjoys a 
close relationship to the tribe.85 Pursuant to the fourth factor, evaluating 
whether the tribe intended for the entity to enjoy sovereign immunity, the 
court found that because numerous tribal ordinances and corporate 
documents relating to the entity referenced sovereign immunity in a 
manner that clearly expressed the tribe’s belief that the entities were 
entitled to immunity from suit, this factor also favored extending tribal 
sovereign immunity.  
                                                           
80
 See Breakthrough Management Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino and Resort, 
629 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir.2010) (The BMG court amended a prior ten factor arm of 
the tribe test, and adopted a less exacting six factor test. The previous Tenth Circuit arm 
of the tribe ten factor test can be found in Johnson v. Harrah’s Kansas Casino Corp., 
2006 WL 463138 (D.Kan. Feb. 23, 2006)). 
81
 Id. at 1182.  
82
 Id. at 1178.  
83
 Id. at 1173. 
84
 Id. at 1191. 
85
 Id.  
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Likewise, the BMG court found the second factor and the fifth factor 
to favor the extension of tribal sovereign immunity because the revenue 
generated by the Authority is predominately allocated to the tribe itself. 
Consistent with the second factor, the court found that the entity was 
created for the financial benefit of the tribe, because the language of the 
ordinances creating the entity showed intended economic benefit to the 
tribe, and the profit sharing scheme delegated a majority of the revenue 
back to the tribe or its members.86 Similarly, under the fifth factor, the court 
found that the revenue scheme favored tribal immunity because about 
85% of the profits are distributed directly to the tribal government.87 
 
The BMG court found that while the board and executive level 
employees were not entirely comprised of tribal members, a sufficient 
number exercised control to find the third factor in favor of the Authority 
and immunity. In accordance with the third factor, which focuses on the 
amount of control the tribe has over the entity, the court found the 
managerial structures of the Authority and its subsidiary to weigh both for 
and against the tribe. While the Authority’s board of directors are all tribal 
members and also hold seats on tribal council, the chief financial officer of 
the Authority, the general manager of the casino, the chief financial officer 
of the casino, and twelve of the fifteen directors of the casino are non-
tribal members.88 Lastly, under the sixth factor, the court found that the 
purposes of tribal sovereign immunity would be served in this case 
because immunity would protect the treasury of the tribe.89  
 
5. A Universal Arm of the Tribe Test 
 
While all of the federal courts of appeals apply slightly different 
tests when determining which tribal entities are entitled to tribal sovereign 
immunity, adequate consistency exists between the various tests to yield a 
universal arm of the tribal test by which tribes can create and operate 
revenue-generating enterprises. This proposed universal arm of the tribe 
test incorporates several factors present in all of the arm of the tribe tests 
used by the federal courts of appeals. Moreover, this proposed test 
incorporates the underlying federal policies of tribal sovereign immunity 
into the analysis. The factors incorporated into the universal arm of the 
                                                           
86
 Id. at 1192.  
87
 Id. at 1194. 
88
 Id. at 1192-1193. 
89
 Id. at 1195. 
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tribe test are: (a) the method of creation of the entity; (b) tribal control over 
the entity; (c) benefits accorded to the tribe by the entity; and, (d) whether 
the policies of tribal sovereign immunity are served by allowing the entity 
the protections of tribal sovereign immunity. The following section will 
evaluate criteria necessary to satisfy each factor as informed by previous 
decisions issued by numerous circuit courts of appeals.  
 
i.  Creation of the Entity    
 
The first factor examines the creation of the tribal entity. Under this 
inquiry, the court should consider whether the entity was created pursuant 
to tribal law, and whether the entity was dependent upon the tribal 
government approval and involvement throughout its formation. If the 
entity was created pursuant to tribal law, this significantly weighs in favor 
of the application of tribal sovereign immunity to the entity.90 
 
ii.  Tribal Control over the Entity  
 
The second factor examines the control the tribe exerts over the 
entity. Here, the court should examine how much influence the tribe has 
over the structure, ownership, and management of the entity. Additionally, 
the court should take the membership of the board of directors and 
executive officers of the entity into account, as well as their method of 
appointment. If the board of directors or trustees of the entity are members 
of the tribe, this weighs in favor of extending tribal sovereign immunity to 
the entity.91 Similarly, if the chief executive officers of the entity are tribal 
members or are appointed by the tribe, this also favors immunity.92  
 
iii.  Benefits the Tribe Receives from the Entity  
 
The third factor examines the economic and social benefits the 
entity conveys to the tribe. When determining the benefits accorded to the 
tribe, the court should evaluate the financial contributions made to the 
                                                           
90
 See, e.g., Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d at 1043; Allen v. Gold 
Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1046; Breakthrough Management Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi 
Gold Casino and Resort, 629 F.3d at 1191-1192;  
91
 See, e.g., Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d at 1040; Breakthrough 
Management Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino and Resort, 629 F.3d at 1194.  
92
 See, e.g., Breakthrough Management Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino and 
Resort, 629 F.3d at 1194. 
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tribe by the entity. Likewise, the court should examine how the revenue is 
allocated.  
 
With regard to the non-financial benefits conferred on the tribe, the 
inquiry focuses on whether the entity will further enable the tribe to 
develop self-sufficiency, promote tribal economic development, and 
generate jobs and revenue to support the tribe’s government and 
governmental services and programs.93 
 
iv.  Policy Purposes of Tribal Sovereign Immunity   
 
The fourth factor examines the policies underlying the doctrine of 
tribal sovereign immunity, its connection to tribal economic development, 
and whether those policies are served by granting immunity to the tribal 
business entity in question.94 Specifically, the court should consider 
whether extending immunity to the entity “directly protects the sovereign 
tribe’s treasury, which is one of the historic purposes of sovereign 
immunity in general.”95  
 
C.  Are Tribal Payday Lenders Entitled to Immunity Under the 
Arm of the Tribe Test? An Examination of the Payday Lending 
Operations of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma 
 
 The decisions of the federal courts of appeals regarding tribal 
sovereign immunity and the corresponding arm of the tribe test, when 
evaluated together, reasonably inform a universal arm of the tribe test. 
This universal arm of the tribe test incorporates four factors. These factors 
evaluate the creation of the entity, the control the tribe has over the entity, 
the benefits accorded to the tribe by the entity, and determine whether the 
policies of tribal sovereign immunity would be served by deeming a 
particular entity in question an arm of the tribe.  
 
To illustrate the application of these factors to tribal payday lending 
enterprises, the payday lending entities of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma 
                                                           
93
 See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1046-1047. 
94
 See Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1111 (Ariz.1989) (“Tribal sovereign 
immunity should only apply when doing so furthers the federal policies behind the 
immunity doctrine”); Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 294 (Minn.1996) (Courts 
should determine “whether federal policies intended to promote Indian tribal autonomy 
are furthered by the extension of immunity to the business entity”).  
95
 Breakthrough Management Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino and Resort, 629 
F.3d at 1195; Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1047.  
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(the Tribe) are evaluated. Given the specifics of the Tribe’s payday lending 
operations and the corresponding analysis in the context of the universal 
arm of the tribe test, this paper concludes that these kinds of tribal payday 
lending operations do function as arms of the tribe under the law, and are 
therefore entitled to the protections of tribal sovereign immunity.  
 
The Tribe operates numerous payday lending businesses in a 
manner consistent with the federal courts of appeals’ application of tribal 
sovereign immunity to entities acting as arms of the tribe. The Miami Tribe 
of Oklahoma created the payday lending entities pursuant to tribal law, 
and the tribal government sufficiently controls the actions of the entities. 
Furthermore, the operation of the payday lending entities has conferred 
great benefits on the Tribe as a whole, and extension of immunity to the 
entities would honor the policies underlying tribal sovereign immunity. 
 
The Tribe is a federally recognized tribe comprised of over 3,800 
enrolled citizens.96 The Tribe is associated with the online payday loan 
providers USFastCash®, AmeriLoan®, and UnitedCashLoans®.97 The 
Tribe operates the tribal economic development authority Miami Nation 
Enterprises, Inc. (MNE), which in turn owns and operates the online 
payday loan providers in question.98 
 
Currently, MNE operates as a political economic subdivision of the 
Tribe created by the Tribe to pursue economic development opportunities 
for the good of the Miami Nation and its citizens.99 MNE oversees tribally 
owned companies such as Miami Business Services, Miami Cineplex, and 
ServiceWorld Computer in addition to several payday lending 
operations.100 Similar to the tribal Economic Development Authority in 
                                                           
96
 Miami Tribe of Oklahoma, http://www.miamination.com/mto/about.html (last visited Apr. 
20, 2013). 
97
 Miami Tribe of Oklahoma and MNE Services, Inc., www.usfastcash.com, 
www.ameriloan.com, unitedcashloans.com (last visited Apr. 20,, 2013).  
98
 The disclaimer on the websites affiliated with the Miami Tribe claim to be operated by 
MNE and owned by the Tribe (“MNE, Inc., doing business as 
USFastCash®/AmeriLoan®/ UnitedCashLoans®, is a tribal lending entity wholly owned 
and operated by the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma, a Sovereign Nation recognized by the 
United States government under the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936”). See supra 
note 66. 
99
 Miami Nation Enterprises Inc. http://www.mn-e.com/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
100
 Miami Nation Enterprises Inc., http://www.mn-e.com/companies (last visited Apr. 20, 
2013). 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume I, Issue II – Spring 2013 
 
409 
 
Allen, 101 MNE is the Tribe’s economic development authority and likewise 
enjoys immunity from suit as an arm of the tribe.102 
 
1. Was the Payday Lending Entity Created Pursuant to 
Tribal Law? 
 
MNE and the payday lending subsidiaries were created pursuant to 
a tribal constitution and through the enactment of specific tribal 
ordinances, favoring application of tribal sovereign immunity to the 
entities. To begin with, the constitution of the Tribe creates a Business 
Committee, which is expressly authorized to enact resolutions and 
ordinances “to transact business and otherwise speak or act on behalf of 
the tribe in all matters on which the Tribe is empowered to act.”103 Citing a 
“critical need for the development of economic activities to provide for the 
well-being of the citizens of the Miami Tribe,” the Business Committee 
established MNE pursuant to the tribal constitution as “a subordinate 
economic enterprise of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma having the purposes, 
powers, and duties as herein or hereafter provided by tribal law.”104  
 
The tribal resolution and ordinances establishing MNE specifically 
authorized MNE to engage in “providing sources of revenue through direct 
tribal business activities.”105 Consistent with established tribal law, the 
Tribe enacted a tribal ordinance to permit MNE to engage in the payday 
lending business.106 Specifically, the ordinance authorized the Tribe to 
issue payday loan licenses to MNE.107 
 
2. How Much Control Does the Tribe Have in the Operation 
of the Payday Lending Business? 
 
 The Tribe owns, operates, and sufficiently controls both MNE and 
the payday lending entities. The relationship between the Tribal Council, 
the Business Committee, MNE, and the payday lending entities is 
sufficiently close to properly permit the entity to share in the tribe’s 
immunity. 
                                                           
101
 Breakthrough Management Group, Inc., v. Chukchansi Gold Casino and Resort, 629 
F.3d 1173 (10th Cir.2010). 
102
 Id. 
103
 MIAMI CONST., art. VI § 1. 
104
 Amended Miami Nation Enterprises Act, §§ 202(a), 101(a).  
105
 Miami Tribe of Oklahoma Business Enterprises Act § 102(a). 
106
 Miami Tribal Council Res. 04-62 (2002). 
107
 Id. 
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MNE’s board of directors consists of three members, two of whom 
must be members of the Tribe.108 Members of the board of directors are 
appointed by the Chief of the Tribe, with the advice and consent of the 
tribal Business Committee.109 The tribal Business Committee appoints the 
executive officers of MNE, including the chief operating officer. The CEO 
of MNE is responsible for the day-to-day operations of MNE, but is 
accountable to and directed in policy matters by the MNE board of 
directors. In turn, the MNE board of directors is ultimately answerable to 
the tribal council. 
 
 The tribal ordinance permitting MNE to engage in the payday 
lending business also imposes substantive and regulatory requirements 
on MNE’s payday loan business, charging the Tribe’s Business 
Committee with ensuring MNE’s compliance with the requirements of the 
ordinance.110  
 
3. How Do the Payday Lending Entities Benefit the Tribe? 
 
 The operation of the Tribe’s payday lending enterprises through 
MNE confers substantial benefits on the Tribe itself, which favors the 
conclusion that the entities are in fact arms of the tribe. The revenues from 
the payday lending operations have been used, among other things, to 
build a new headquarters for MNE. This is a significant benefit to the Tribe 
because MNE provides a considerable portion of its revenues to the 
Tribe’s general fund, which enables the operation of the tribal government. 
Moreover, MNE’s payday lending operations also employ many tribal 
members on the reservations, where MNE headquarters are located. The 
revenues from the payday lending enterprises have also been used to 
fund various tribal programs, including a scholarship program for post-
secondary education.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
108
 Amended Miami Nations Enterprise Act § 202(a); Miami Tribal Council Res. 05-14 
(2005).  
109
 Miami Tribal Council Res. 05-14 (2005). 
110
 Miami Tribal Council Res. 04-62 (2002). 
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4. Is Immunity Consistent with the Policies of Tribal 
Sovereign Immunity?  
 
Extending tribal sovereign immunity to MNE’s payday lending 
subsidiaries would adhere to the policies of tribal sovereign immunity. 
First, MNE operates the payday lending subsidiaries and the Tribe itself 
exercises considerable control over MNE’s actions as previously 
discussed. Furthermore, extending the Tribe’s immunity to MNE and the 
payday lending operations is consistent with the policies of tribal sovereign 
immunity for no other reason than that the tribes have been economically 
and socially benefitted by the payday loan activities.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Payday lending itself may be predatory in nature and fall short of a 
reputable business operation, but in light of difficult economic 
circumstances, this business model may be a welcomed temporary 
solution to some tribes’ financial challenges. While payday lending is in 
some respects analogous to the operation of gaming enterprises under 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, it is by no means an appropriate 
permanent solution to solve the issue of tribal financial needs. More 
importantly, if the operation of tribal payday lending enterprises is within 
the law and policy of tribal sovereign immunity, tribes should be able to 
profit from this industry. Despite criticism of payday lending, tribes have 
the right to choose which industries they decide to profit from. 
 
The Court has not yet taken a case addressing the specific kind of 
business entities, such as payday lending operations, entitled to tribal 
sovereign immunity. If the current Court is confronted with a case involving 
a tribally affiliated payday lender, likely deference will not be given to the 
objective and reasonable tests adopted by the federal courts of appeals. 
Instead, it is widely anticipated that if the Court were to take up a case 
involving tribal payday lenders who implement questionable business 
models and unethical practices, this set of facts would likely result in a 
harsh curtailment of tribal sovereign immunity. Reigning in sovereign 
immunity would undoubtedly have a detrimental economic and social 
impact on Indian Country.  
 
Payday lending must be conducted ethically with regard to the 
treatment of consumers and recognition must be given to the regulatory 
frameworks governing the industry outside of Indian Country. Moreover, 
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tribes should not conduct payday lending over an extended period of time, 
and if a tribe elects to engage in this business, the tribe should attempt to 
fly under the radar of the press, federal officials, and the courts. Most 
importantly, tribally owned and operated payday lenders must act in a 
manner consistent with the principles of tribal sovereign immunity. 
Otherwise, a few misinformed tribal nations may abrogate the right to 
sovereign immunity for all of Indian Country.  
 
